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How do addictive drugs hijack the brain’s reward system? This review speculates how normal, physiological
reward processes may be affected by addictive drugs. Addictive drugs affect acute responses and plasticity
in dopamine neurons and postsynaptic structures. These effects reduce reward discrimination, increase the
effects of reward prediction error signals, and enhance neuronal responses to reward-predicting stimuli,
which may contribute to compulsion. Addictive drugs steepen neuronal temporal reward discounting and
create temporal myopia that impairs the control of drug taking. Tonically enhanced dopamine levels may
disturb working memory mechanisms necessary for assessing background rewards and thus may generate
inaccurate neuronal reward predictions. Drug-induced working memory deficits may impair neuronal risk
signaling, promote risky behaviors, and facilitate preaddictive drug use. Malfunctioning adaptive reward
coding may lead to overvaluation of drug rewards. Many of these malfunctions may result in inadequate
neuronal decision mechanisms and lead to choices biased toward drug rewards.Introduction
Drugs of addiction have two principal, closely related functions.
First, they constitute rewards, as they induce learning, approach
behavior, emotions, and positive feelings, just as natural rewards
do. Second, they modify the brain’s physiological reward
system. However, their influence on the brain is not constrained
by physiological receptors and many regulatory mechanisms
engaged by natural rewards. Thus addiction constitutes
primarily a disorder of the reward system.
The most straightforward influence of addictive drugs on the
brain occurs on the dopamine system. Addictive drugs change
the phasic characteristics of dopamine activity in reward
signaling and the tonic function of dopamine levels in permit-
ting and facilitating a large variety of motor and cognitive
functions (see Schultz, 2007, for review). However, the dopa-
mine system does not function in isolation; therefore addictive
drugs influence all major reward systems including the
striatum, orbitofrontal cortex, and amygdala. Addictive drugs
are likely to disturb many of their functions, which may
contribute to the drugs’ behavioral effects and the addiction
process itself.
This review describes a number of normal, physiological
reward processes and speculates how they may be affected
by addictive drugs. This is not an attempt to explain drug addic-
tion, nor does it describe its pathophysiology, which is complex
and beyond the present scope. Rather, the review assesses to
which extent drugs may modify well-characterized, normal,
physiological, neuronal reward processing. The description
remains largely at the systems neuroscience level of reward
function without going into details of cellular and synaptic func-
tions. Althoughmany effects of addictive drugs on the dopamine
systemare known, there is limited firm understanding about drug
influence on neuronal processing of reward and cognition. We
will use the existing data to make hypotheses about crucialdysfunctions of and beyond the dopamine system that might
explain some of the behavioral alterations and possibly shed
some light on the addiction process itself. The presented
phenomena are primarily neurobiological and should be suffi-
ciently general to apply to many current concepts of behavioral
reward functions including wanting versus liking, habits versus
goal-directed behavior, and hedonia versus decision-making
that are elaborated in current psychological and economic
addiction theories. As the behavioral neurophysiology of reward
processing is usually restricted to learning, approach behavior,
and decision-making, other behavioral components of drug
addiction such as urges, cravings, and withdrawal will not be
addressed.
Actions of Addictive Drugs on Dopamine
Neurotransmission
The dopamine system constitutes the primary target of addictive
drugs (Wise and Bozarth, 1987; Wise, 2002). The drugs affect all
stages of phasic and tonic dopamine processes, from the
generation of action potentials in dopamine cell bodies to the
effects of dopamine on postsynaptic neurons. While focusing
on striatal dopamine, similar mechanisms apply to cortical and
amygdalar dopamine innervation.
Plasticity of Dopamine Neurons
Major drugs of addiction such as cocaine, amphetamine,
morphine, heroine, nicotine, and ethanol act on glutamatergic
synapses on midbrain dopamine neurons and lead to NMDA-
dependent, AMPA-mediated long-term potentiation in dopa-
mine neurons (Figure 1A) (Ungless et al., 2001; Saal et al.,
2003). Thus excitatory influences on these neurons become
enhanced (Figure 1B), in particular NMDA-dependent burst
firing (Zweifel et al., 2009). Amphetamine leads also to reduction
of long-term depression in dopamine neurons (Figure 1C)
(Jones et al., 2000). Thus subthreshold fluctuations of excitatoryNeuron 69, February 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 603
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Figure 1. Actions of Addictive Drugs on Dopamine Processes
(A) Long-term potentiation in ventral tegmental dopamine neurons in vitro induced by cocaine. Note the increase in AMPA excitatory postsynaptic current (EPSC)
following systemic cocaine (bottom). From Argilli et al. (2008), with permission by Society for Neuroscience.
(B) Scheme of increased burst responses of midbrain dopamine neurons following cocaine-induced long-term potentiation. From Jones and Bonci (2005), with
permission by Elsevier Ltd.
(C) Blockade of long-term depression in ventral tegmental dopamine neurons in vitro by bath application of amphetamine. From Jones et al. (2000), with permis-
sion by Society for Neuroscience.
(D) Dose-dependent enhancement by cocaine of dopamine efflux induced by single electrical pulse in striatum slices. From Jones et al. (1995), with permission by
the American Society for Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics.
(E) Classical scheme of differential influence of global dopamine reinforcement signal on selectively active corticostriatal neurotransmission. The dopamine
reinforcement signal (r) modifies conjointly active Hebbian synapses (a) at striatal neuron (I) but leaves inactive synapses (b) unchanged. There are about
10,000 cortical terminals and 1000 dopamine varicosities on each striatal neuron (Doucet et al., 1986; Groves et al., 1995. Drawing is based on data from Freund
et al. (1984) and Smith and Bolam (1990).
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Perspectiveinputs to dopamine neurons would increase or even generate
action potentials in the absence of reward, generating a false
reward signal.
Phasic Striatal Dopamine Changes
Electrical stimulation of dopamine neurons mimicking natural
dopamine responses to reward induces striatal dopamine
release. Systemically administered cocaine or amphetamine
enhances the stimulus-induced dopamine increase by blocking
the reuptake transporter (Figure 1D) (Jones et al., 1995; Gonon,
1997; Venton et al., 2003). Thus, cocaine further exaggerates the
striatal dopamine changes following an excitatory dopamine
signal that is already enhanced, or falsely generated, by synaptic
plasticity at dopamine input synapses.
Tonic Striatal Dopamine Levels
Addictive drugs increase the tonic concentration of striatal dopa-
mine by various mechanisms (Di Chiara and Imperato, 1988).
Opiates and nicotine enhance the tonic firing of midbrain dopa-604 Neuron 69, February 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.mine neurons (morphine: Matthews and German 1984; Johnson
and North, 1992; nicotine: Lichtensteiger et al., 1982; Pido-
plichko et al., 1997), although depressant effects may occur
(Bonci and Malenka, 1999). Cocaine and amphetamine block
reuptake transport, which enhances tonic dopamine concentra-
tions despite suppressed dopamine neuron firing (Bunney et al.,
1973). It is well known that tonic dopamine concentrations are
finely regulated within postsynaptic brain areas (Chesselet,
1984). Deviations from these optimal levels, including increases
of local tonic dopamine concentrations and dopamine turnover,
lead to impaired striatal and cortical mechanisms underlying
working memory, sensory discrimination, and planning (Murphy
et al., 1996; Elliott et al., 1997; Liu et al., 2008), which may
underlie the working memory deficits seen in drug abusers
(Ornstein et al., 2000). Thus through their effects on tonic dopa-
mine levels, drugs may impair striatal and cortical mechanisms
beyond reward processing.
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PerspectiveDopamine-Dependent Transient Enhancement
of Striatal Responses
Varicosities of dopamine axons impinge on dendritic spines of
striatal and cortical neurons that are contacted by cortical
afferents in a triad arrangement (Figure 1E) (Freund et al.,
1984; Goldman-Rakic et al., 1989). This arrangement allows
dopamine neurotransmission to affect postsynaptic process-
ing. Dopamine D1 receptor activation enhances striatal post-
synaptic depolarizations (Herna´ndez-Lo´pez et al., 1997). Thus
increased or false dopamine signals following addictive drugs
may exert a facilitatory effect on excitatory responses in the
striatum, and possibly the cortex. The enhancement via D1
receptors may help the transition from drug use to addiction,
whereas D2 or D3 receptors may be involved in the expression
of addiction (Capriles et al., 2003; Kalivas and Volkow, 2005).
Responses in subpopulations of striatal and cortical neurons
reflect reward prediction and movement initiation (Hikosaka
et al., 1989; Schultz and Romo, 1992; Watanabe, 1996; Has-
sani et al., 2001; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006). Thus, by
enhancing responses to drug-predicting stimuli, and possibly
reducing responses to natural rewards (Kalivas and Volkow,
2005), addictive drugs could prioritize reward prediction and
movement initiation.
Dopamine-Dependent Striatal and Cortical Plasticity
The classic triad arrangement of dopamine varicosities,
dendritic spines, and cortical inputs (Figure 1E) allows dopa-
mine to enhance spike-time-dependent plasticity at active
cortico-striatal and cortico-cortical synapses (Gurden et al.,
2000; Reynolds et al., 2001; Wang et al., 2006; Izhikevich,
2007; Pawlak and Kerr, 2008; Shen et al., 2008). The induced
long-term potentiation and long-term depression are candidate
mechanisms for phasic dopamine signals to mediate behavioral
learning.
Thus, by affecting striatal and cortical plasticity, addictive
drugs could lead to long-lasting changes of the motor, reward,
and cognitive functions of these structures.
Dopamine Reward Signals
Dopamine systems are involved in drug addiction in two
important ways. First, data from neuronal stimulation, lesioning,
neuropharmacology, and neurophysiology show that the dopa-
mine system is a principal component of the brain’s reward
system. Its activation induces learning and approach behavior.
Second, drugs of addiction constitute rewards and crucially
affect neurotransmission in dopamine and associated brain
systems. In bypassing sensory receptors and their activity-
limiting mechanisms, they induce unphysiological dopamine
stimulation, which may lead to addiction.
Prediction Error and Learning
Normal mechanisms. According to reinforcement learning
theory, prediction errors act to increase or decrease the
prediction of outcome value and thus mediate learning
(Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Sutton and Barto, 1981). In its
most simple expression, the reward prediction error d captures
the discrepancy between received reward R and prediction
V in trial t:
dðtÞ=RðtÞ  VðtÞ;and serves to update the predicted reward value V in the next
trial:
Vðt+ 1Þ=VðtÞ+ kdðtÞ;
with k as learning rate.
Most dopamine neurons are activated by rewards and reward-
predicting stimuli. The reward response codes a prediction error;
a reward that is better than predicted elicits an activation (posi-
tive prediction error, R > V), a fully predicted reward (R = V) draws
no response, and a reward that is worse than predicted induces
a depression (negative error, R < V) (Figure 2A) (Schultz et al.,
1997). The response implements the teaching term of efficient
reinforcement learning models (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972;
Sutton and Barto, 1981) and occurs during learning (Schultz
et al., 1993; Hollerman and Schultz, 1998). Stimuli not associated
with prediction errors are blocked from behavioral and neuronal
learning (Waelti et al., 2001).
Potential vulnerabilities. A recent modeling study hypothe-
sized that drug addiction may result from associative learning;
the drug-induced higher dopamine levels would mimic a positive
dopamine prediction error signal irrespective of any true error
and affect striatal plasticity (Redish, 2004). The present hypoth-
esis is based on the mostly phasic effects of addictive drugs on
phasic dopamine signals and their consequences on neuronal
plasticity. While there is considerable debate about a causal
role of dopamine in driving learning, the following descriptions
assume that the prediction error contributes, at least to some
extent, to behavioral learning. Although the electrophysiological
characterization of prediction error coding cannot solve the
issue, the effects of electrical and optogenetic dopamine stimu-
lation on learning (Corbett and Wise, 1980; Tsai et al., 2009)
suggest a dopamine contribution to several forms of learning.
The long-term potentiation of excitatory inputs to dopamine
neurons by addictive drugs (Figure 1A) would increase the
phasic activation of dopamine neurons by positive prediction
errors (R > V) (Figure 1B) and the resulting impulse-dependent
striatal dopamine release. Psychostimulants such as cocaine
would further enhance this phasic striatal dopamine increase
(Figure 1C). Compatible with this reasoning, even a single admin-
istration of nonaddictive dopamine receptor agonists such as
L-Dopa leads to enhanced positive prediction error signals in hu-
mans (Pessiglione et al., 2006). By contrast, the reduction of
striatal dopamine following negative prediction errors (R < V)
would be blunted by the tonic dopamine increase induced by
all major drugs of addiction. Finally, there would be no phasic
striatal dopamine change in the absence of prediction errors (R
= V), as the drug-induced tonic elevation of dopamine levels
would not adequately mimic a phasic, positive prediction error
signal. Indeed, tonic dopamine increases affect learning much
less than phasic changes (e.g., Grace, 1991; Tsai et al., 2009).
The enhanced influence of positive prediction errors and the
blunted effect of negative prediction errors would lead to mono-
tonically increasing striatal plasticity. Thus, the value prediction V
would fail to asymptote and ultimately exceed the value of the
primary reward R. Although saturation and self-regulatory mech-
anisms would ultimately limit the process, the resulting extreme
induction of reward prediction could overstimulate approach
behavior to the level of compulsion. Conditioned inhibition mayNeuron 69, February 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 605
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Figure 2. Phasic Increases of Neurophysiological Dopamine Activity following Real and Potential Rewards
(A) Activations following reward prediction errors occurring in 75%–90% of dopamine neurons (right) and reward-predicting stimuli (60%–75% of neurons; left).
Data from Schultz (1998).
(B) Generalization of phasic activating population response from reward predicting stimulus (gray) to explicit no-reward predicting stimulus (black; conditioned
inhibitor). The shorter and smaller activations to the conditioned inhibitor are partly offset by depressions. Similar generalizing activations are seen with
unrewarded stimuli in up to 50% of dopamine neurons (Waelti et al., 2001; Tobler et al., 2003). Data from Tobler et al. (2003), with permission by Society for
Neuroscience.
(C) Activations to aversive events. Top: Typical lack of activation to visual stimulus during active avoidance. Primary aversive events activate only about 15% of
dopamine neurons. Aversive responses do not code prediction errors (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009). Bottom: activating population response to conditioned
aversive stimulus due to stimulus generalization in 65% of dopamine neurons (gray: aversive and appetitive stimuli are both visual), but lack of response when
appetitive stimulus is auditory (black). Data from Mirenowicz and Schultz (1996), with permission by MacMillan.
(D) Depressant response to conditioned inhibitor (top) in neuron showing activating response to conditioned excitor (bottom). Data from Tobler et al. (2003), with
permission by Society for Neuroscience.
(E) Phasic activations following novel, physically intense stimuli (about 80%). Activations by physically intense stimuli are substantially reduced when pseudo-
conditioning is controlled for (S. Kobayashi and W. Schultz, 2010, Soc. Neurosci., abstract). Overlapping h-eog traces show horizontal eye movements toward
the novel stimulus; unfocused h-eogs after >60 trials indicate familiarity, accompanied by loss of dopamine responses. Data from Ljungberg et al. (1992), with
permission by American Physiological Society.
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neuronal depression, further contributing to compulsion.
The reduction of long-term depression by amphetamine, and
possibly other psychostimulants such as cocaine, would facili-
tate false phasic activations of dopamine neurons by random
excitations. These activations would occur without any reward
and be independent of actual prediction errors. Postsynaptic
striatal and cortical mechanisms would be unable to distinguish
such false activations from true positive prediction error signals
and react with plastic changes. Thus, any stimulus present
during the action of amphetamine and cocaine would be learned
as a reward predictor and facilitate approach behavior, including
stimuli not associated with prediction errors that are normally
blocked from learning (Waelti et al., 2001).
Reward Discrimination
The capacity to discriminate between different rewards is impor-
tant for selecting the most valuable reward during decision
making. Reward discrimination is limited by two processes,
namely stimulus generalization, which is due to physical simi-
larity between stimuli, and pseudoconditioning, which occurs606 Neuron 69, February 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.via context conditioning by primary reinforcers (Mackintosh,
1974; Sheafor, 1975). The activating dopamine responses to
stimuli consist of two components. The initial component is
prone to generalization and thus discriminates poorly, whereas
the second component distinguishes well between differently
rewarded stimuli (Figure 2B). Generalization in the first compo-
nent of dopamine responses occurs with neutral stimuli (Schultz
and Romo, 1990; Waelti et al., 2001), aversive stimuli (Mireno-
wicz and Schultz, 1996; Joshua et al., 2008; Matsumoto and
Hikosaka, 2009), explicit nonreward predicting stimuli (condi-
tioned inhibitors; Tobler et al., 2003), and delay-predicting stimuli
(Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008). Substantial fractions of dopa-
mine neurons are activated by physically salient stimuli (Ljung-
berg et al., 1992), although these responses seem to be largely
due to pseudoconditioning (Kobayashi and Schultz, 2010). The
initial, ‘‘false,’’ generalized or pseudoconditioned activation is
often followed by a depressant response that may not entirely
cancel the effects of the activation. Thus stimulus generalization
may lead to net striatal dopamine release with neutral stimuli
(Day et al., 2007). However, although generalization and
Neuron
Perspectivepseudoconditioning reduce reward discrimination, they may
play a useful role in enhancing the detection of potential rewards.
The limited reward discrimination by dopamine neurons may
become disastrous for drug addiction in two additive ways. First,
drugs would enhance the generalized activations by neutral and
aversive stimuli and the pseudoconditioned responses in
rewarding contexts, along with the primary responses to re-
warded stimuli and rewards. Second, the drug-induced tonic
striatal dopamine increase may blunt the depression that often
follows and partly compensates the generalized or peudocondi-
tioned activation. The enhanced generalized or peudocondi-
tioned dopamine activation would result in reduced reward
discrimination by postsynaptic striatal mechanisms. Thus, under
the influence of drugs, less rewarded, neutral, or aversive stimuli
would lead to stronger phasic striatal dopamine changes and
increased dopamine-dependent postsynaptic responsiveness
and plasticity. Interestingly, addictive drugs do not usually
induce withdrawal behavior before addiction develops, even
though the few dopamine activations induced by aversive stimuli
are likely to be also enhanced, confirming the strength of the
reward over that of aversive dopamine function.
The breakdown of dopamine reward discrimination does not
necessarily mean impairment of reward discrimination in
general. Populations of neurons in the striatum, orbitofrontal
cortex, and many other reward structures discriminate well
between different rewards, including liquids, foods, and drugs
(Carelli and Deadwyler, 1994; Bowman et al., 1996; Chang
et al., 1998; Tremblay and Schultz, 1999; Hassani et al., 2001).
Obviously, these reward discriminations rely on inputs other
than dopamine inputs. In this way, general reward discrimination
may be maintained during drug action, even when dopamine-
dependent learning mechanisms lose discrimination.
Punishment and Conditioned Inhibition
Due to the long-term consequences, drugs should be consid-
ered as aversive; however, they rarely induce avoidance
behavior as the aversive effect is overwhelmed by the rewarding
component. Furthermore, drug use prevents drug users from
receiving other rewards, including money, salaries, and friends.
Thus drugs have a conditioned inhibitory component.
Minor fractions of dopamine neurons are activated by aversive
stimuli when stimulus generalization is ruled out, and many
dopamine neurons show depressions of activity (Figure 2C) (Mir-
enowicz and Schultz 1996; Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009).
Conditioned inhibitors lead to occasional activating stimulus
generalization responses (Figure 2B), but depressant responses
prevail (Figure 2D) (Tobler et al., 2003).
Dopamine neurons should respond with depression of activity
to the aversive and inhibitory functions of the aversive compo-
nent of drugs, which would reduce the overall dopamine
response to drugs. However, the enhanced response general-
ization and the tonic increase in dopamine induced by all major
drugs of addiction would blunt the effects of depressant dopa-
mine responses on striatal mechanisms and thus annihilate the
potentially moderating aversive component of addictive drugs.
Novelty
Novelty induces attention, modulates the learning rate param-
eter of associability learning rules, and thus enhances learning
(Mackintosh 1975; Pearce and Hall, 1980). Novelty enhancesexisting dopamine responses and induces activations to stimuli
of sufficient minimal intensity (Figure 2E) (Ljungberg et al., 1992).
Addictive drugs may increase the novelty response of dopamine
neurons at their inputs and increase striatal impulse-dependent
dopamine release. This effect may enhance behavioral learning
via striatal plasticity, which may be conceptually linked to the
learning rate parameter that determines the impact of the predic-
tion error.
Temporal Discounting
Temporal discounting refers to the observation that later rewards
have lower subjective value than earlier rewards. Decision
makers need to control their usual preferences for earlier
rewards (impulsivity) to avoid loss of potentially large rewards.
Temporal discounting is associated with reduction of neuronal
responses to later rewards in all major reward structures. Addic-
tive drugs may affect impulsivity, enhance temporal discounting,
and lead to disadvantageous choices via their effects on
neuronal reward responses.
Behavioral preferences for sooner over later rewards indicate
that delayed rewards lose subjective value even though their
objective value remains unchanged (Ainslie, 1975; Mazur,
2002). The factors underlying temporal discounting include
impatience, impulsivity, value deterioration, and fear of loss.
Neurophysiological responses to reward-predicting stimuli
decrease with increasing delays in orbitofrontal, dorsolateral
prefrontal and parietal cortex, striatum, and dopamine neurons
(Figure 3A) (Roesch and Olson, 2005; Roesch et al., 2007,
2009; Kim et al., 2008; Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008; Louie
and Glimcher, 2010). Correspondingly, human blood oxygen-
level dependent (BOLD) responses to reward delay-predicting
stimuli measured in functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) decrease with increasing delays in ranges between
seconds and months in ventral striatum and medial prefrontal
cortex, correlating with individual degrees of temporal discount-
ing (Figure 3C) (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Gregorios-Pippas
et al., 2009). Response decreases across a few seconds may
reflect an innate discounting mechanism that evolved for dealing
with value deterioration of natural rewards. The dopamine
prediction error response at the time of the reward increases
with the delay (Figure 3B).
Temporal discounting may contribute to drug addiction as
myopia on immediate rewards and neglect of larger distant
rewards. Addicted individuals discount nondrug rewards such
as money steeper than controls do (Figure 3D), which reflects
drug exposure rather than a premorbid trait (Bickel et al.,
1999). Furthermore addicts discount drugs more than nondrug
rewards (Bickel and Marsch, 2001). Steeper discounting with
the highly valuable drugs comparedwith the less valuablemoney
is at odds with the usually steeper discounting of smaller
compared with larger reward values when drugs are not involved
(Kirby and Marakovic, 1996), suggesting that normal behavioral
discounting is overridden and enhanced by drugs.
Behavioral discounting is correlated with neuronal discounting
in nonaddicted individuals (Figure 3C) and might show similar
relationships in drug addicts. Steeper neuronal discounting
may be based on increased neuronal responses to reward-
predicting stimuli in striatum and frontal cortex and produceNeuron 69, February 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 607
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Figure 3. Temporal Discounting
(A) Temporal discounting of dopamine responses to reward delay-predicting stimuli. Stimulus-reward delays were 2 (brown), 4 (green), 8 (orange), and 16 s (blue),
each being indicated by a different, small fractal stimulus. Averaged normalized population responses from 54 electrophysiologically recorded single dopamine
neurons (top) suggest hyperbolic discounting (bottom). From Kobayashi and Schultz (2008), with permission by Society for Neuroscience.
(B) Increasing responses of dopamine neurons to delivery of identical liquid reward magnitude following increasing reward delays. Top: Averaged normalized
population responses from 33 dopamine neurons. Bottom: Hyperbolic increase of neuronal activity with delays. FromKobayashi and Schultz (2008), with permis-
sion by Society for Neuroscience.
(C) Temporal discounting of fMRI BOLD responses to reward delay-predicting stimuli in human ventral striatum. Top: Hyperbolic BOLD discounting in seven
participants showing behavioral discounting, but absent BOLD discounting in seven behavioral nondiscounters. Each objective interval (4, 6, 9, and 13.5 s)
was indicated by a different, small fractal stimulus. Subjective stimulus-reward delays were individually estimated by peak-interval procedure; their averages
(triangles and squares) were used for curve-fitting. Bottom: Correlations between BOLD and behavioral hyperbolic discount factors (15 participants). From
Gregorios-Pippas et al. (2009), with permission by American Physiological Association.
(D) Temporal discounting in opioid addicts. Top: Steeper discounting of monetary reward in addicts compared with controls. Bottom: Steeper discounting in
addicts for heroin compared with money. From Madden et al. (1997), with permission by American Psychological Association.
Neuron
Perspectivehigher reward prediction as a result of several drug effects.
Altered prediction error responses could increase striatal
plasticity and enhance neuronal responses and reward predic-
tion; positive dopamine prediction error responses at the time
of the reward (Figure 3B) would be increased because more
discounted reward value leads to larger prediction error; nega-
tive prediction error signals would be blunted by increased tonic
dopamine levels. Further factors could be changes in dopamine-
dependent presynaptic and postsynaptic plasticity (Figures 1A
and 1E) and higher phasic dopamine changes with cocaine- or
amphetamine-induced reuptake blockade (Figure 1C).
According to the dual systems account, an impulsive (‘‘beta’’)
system is driven by the value of immediate rewards, whereas an
inhibitory, cognitive (‘‘delta’’) system restrains immediate behav-
ioral reactions and mediates responses to delayed rewards
(Phelps and Pollack, 1968; Laibson, 1997). Human imaging
shows BOLD responses in ventral striatum during choices for
sooner over later rewards (beta system), suggesting impulsive
valuation, and in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during choices
of later rewards that may reflect the action of the behavioral
control system (delta system; McClure et al., 2004).
Addictive drugs may also affect discounting according to the
dual system account. Enhancement of tonic dopamine levels in
prefrontal cortex by drugs may impair the prefrontal control
system (delta), possibly by altering mnemonic and planning
mechanisms in this cortical area (Murphy et al., 1996; Elliott608 Neuron 69, February 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.et al., 1997). In addition, addictive drugs would increase stronger
approach behavior via enhanced neuronal responses to reward-
predicting stimuli which would further challenge behavioral
control. The two mechanisms would lead to additive impair-
ments in discounting and result in more impulsive drug
approach.
Influence of Background Reward
on Prediction (Contingency)
Reward predictions induce approach behavior and provide
essential information for informed decisions. Such predictions
inform about the reward occurring with a stimulus relative to
no stimulus (background). Thus reward predictions are influ-
enced by background reward. The assessment of background
reward requires working memory and discrimination against
stimuli. Disturbance of these processes by addictive drugs
may lead to incorrect predictions resulting in inadequate and
enhanced approach behavior and compulsion.
A stimulus predicts a reward when more reward occurs with
the stimulus than without the stimulus. This can be achieved in
two ways. In conventional experiments, reward is only given
during the stimulus, which amounts to stimulus-reward pairing.
In more realistic situations, some rewards may occur also
without stimuli. Thus reward predictions should take the back-
ground reward into account and provide differential information
about reward during stimuli relative to background. For example,
No background reward -> prediction
Background reward -> no prediction
No background reward -> prediction
0 2 s
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un
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Stimulus
Figure 4. Influence of Background Reward on Prediction
(Contingency) in a Single Amygdala Neuron
The neuron responds to the rewarded stimulus when background is unre-
warded (top), loses the response when background reward increases to that
of the stimulus (middle), and regains the response when background reward
drops again (bottom). Thus the neuronal response to the reward-predicting
stimulus depends entirely on the background reward, thus fulfilling the contin-
gency requirement of animal learning theory. The visual stimulus (fractal during
red-lined period) and reward (purple drop) were identical during the stimulus
period in top, middle, and bottom graphs. From Bermudez and Schultz
(2010a), with permission by American Physiological Society.
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Perspectiveelevating background reward without changing stimulus reward
would reduce the reward prediction by the stimulus as some
reward occurs anyway; the reward becomes less contingent
on the stimulus. By contrast, reducing background reward alone
increases reward prediction by the stimulus, as the reward
becomes more contingent on the stimulus. In animal learning
theory, reward contingency, rather than stimulus-reward pairing,
constitutes the fundamental requirement for reward prediction
and learning (Rescorla, 1967).Most laboratory experiments manipulate reward only during
a stimulus. Neurons in all reward structures show activating or
depressant responses to such stimuli. Manipulations of back-
ground reward use contingency to demonstrate true predictions
rather than simple stimulus-reward pairing. The amygdala is
necessary for true reward prediction, as its lesion makes rats
insensitive to background reward increases; the animals
continue to respond to stimuli that have lost their predictive
properties (Ostlund and Balleine, 2008). Correspondingly, stim-
ulus responses of amygdala neurons are sensitive to changes
in background reward (Figure 4) (Bermudez and Schultz,
2010a). By taking background reward into account, these
neurons are sensitive to contingency and thus code true reward
predictions.
Assessing reward contingencies requires appropriate pro-
cessing of events during the background and relating them to
the specific stimulus. Necessary processes involve working
memory about reward occurrence in the background, discrimi-
nation between background stimuli and the specific stimulus in
order to attribute the reward changes to the background, and
comparison between background reward and stimulus reward.
Working memory and discrimination are known to be impaired
by tonic dopamine increases in frontal and temporal cortex
(Murphy et al., 1996; Elliott et al., 1997; Liu et al., 2008). Thus it
is certainly possible that addictive drugs affect the assessment
of reward contingency via their influence on tonic dopamine
levels in striatum, frontal cortex and, in particular, the amygdala,
with its contingency-sensitive neurons.
Drug addicts often suffer from mental disorders including
anxiety, depression, and schizophrenia. Due to the cognitive
deficits associated with these disorders, drug addicts may
subjectively perceive their environmental background as less
rewarding than normal. Even without mental illness, environ-
mental background rewards are reduced when peer pressure
toward drug use excludes nonusers, which constitutes a known
factor in initial drug consumption. Thus the reduction of back-
ground reward would make stimuli associated with drug rewards
more valuable and induce approach behavior.
The contingency requirement for learning may offer explana-
tions for drug approach and addiction behavior by focusing not
only on the attractive power of drug-associated stimuli, but by
also considering the role of background rewards whose percep-
tion is likely changed in addicts.
Neuronal Risk Signals
In most natural situations rewards occur infrequently and vary
considerably. The resulting incomplete knowledge about
rewards introduces risk and uncertainty. The assessment of
risk is a fundamental component of reward processing, as risk
affects the subjective valuation of rewards and is important for
optimal choices.Risk assessment relieson thecorrect estimation
of reward probabilities. As there are no sensory receptors for
probability, the brain needs to derive probability from the
frequency of past events. The standard deviation of probability
distributions is often termed ‘‘risk,’’ as it refers to the variation
or spread in the distribution. Other valid measures of risk include
the statistical variance (squared standard deviation) and
the informational entropy. Here, risk is viewed as a form ofNeuron 69, February 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 609
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Figure 5. Neuronal Risk Signals
(A) Risk signaling in primate dopamine neurons during the stimulus-reward interval of a Pavlovian task with probabilistic rewards (averaged population activity
from 44 neurons). The risk signal (center, red) is distinctively different from the value prediction and prediction error signal at the time of the stimulus and reward,
respectively (blue). From Fiorillo et al. (2003), with permission by American Association for the Advancement of Science.
(B) Risk signaling in primate single orbitofrontal neuron. The response occurred to the stimulus predicting two equiprobable (p = 0.5) rewardmagnitudes indicated
by the height of two bars; the three stimuli altered pseudorandomly. The response increased monotonically with the standard deviation of the three binary
probability distributions (risk). From O’Neill and Schultz (2010), with permission by Cell Press.
(C) Neuronal probability distortions in human prefrontal cortex correlating with behavioral probability distortions (left). Different prefrontal areas were activated in
subjects showing typical inverted S-shaped distortions (top, blue) and atypical S-shaped distortions (bottom, orange). From Tobler et al. (2008), with permission
by Society for Neuroscience.
(D) Relationship of frontal risk signals to subjective risk preferences. Risk aversion was determined by behavioral choices between safe and risky outcomes.
Activations in human imaging increased with risk aversion (top, potential risk warning signal) and decreased with risk aversion in medial frontal cortex (bottom,
risk seeking signal). From Tobler et al. (2007), with permission by American Physiological Society.
(E) Differential influence of risk on prefrontal value signal in risk avoiders and risk takers. The neuronal responses code reward value, as shown by the dotted and
squared curves, and are decreased in risk avoiders and increased in risk takers. From Tobler et al. (2009), with permission by National Academy of Sciences.
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Perspectiveuncertainty rather than theprobability of losing,which constitutes
negative value. Risk-taking behavior can be enhanced by at least
three mechanisms, namely genuine changes toward risk taking
(‘‘I love the risk’’), overvaluation of high outcomes (‘‘I don’t care
for small change’’), and optimistic distortions of probabilities of
above-average outcomes (‘‘today is my lucky day’’).
Neuronal Risk Signals
In addition to phasically signaling reward prediction errors, about
one-third of dopamine neurons show a separate, slower, and
more sustained activation during the interval between a stimulus
and a reward (Fiorillo et al., 2003). The activation shows an in-
verted U-shaped relationship to probability similar to that of
standard deviation, variance, and entropy, and does not corre-
late with expected value, which increases monotonically with
probability (Figure 5A). Additional tests with binary equiprobable
(p = 0.5) reward distributions hold entropy constant and confirm
the coding of standard deviation or variance rather than reward
value. Thus the slow, sustained dopamine signal codes the risk
of rewarding outcomes. Although the latency of this activation610 Neuron 69, February 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.is too long to participate in decision processes, it might affect
the dopamine released by a subsequent prediction error
response and potentially influence learning via the associability
term of attentional learning rules (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce
and Hall, 1980).
A group of neurons in orbitofrontal cortex signal reward risk
distinct from reward value (Figure 5B) (O’Neill and Schultz,
2010). The risk responses increase monotonically with higher
standard deviations of binary equiprobable distributions of
reward amounts. Their latency is sufficiently short to allow
them to participate in decision making before overt choices
occur. Movement-related activity in posterior cingulate cortex
increases with risk, possibly reflecting the subjective value of
risky rewards (McCoy and Platt, 2005).
Addictive drugs acting on dopamine mechanisms are likely to
affect risk signals in dopamine neurons and dopamine-inner-
vated structures such as orbitofrontal cortex. The dopamine
risk signal may be enhanced by the action of drugs on long-
term potentiation and depression at input synapses of dopamine
Neuron
Perspectiveneurons. The influence of this enhanced signal on postsynaptic
neurons would be boosted by reduced dopamine reuptake
with psychostimulants and by increased dopamine-dependent
postsynaptic responsiveness and plasticity. These mechanisms
could have two separate consequences. First, an enhanced
dopamine risk signal would boost the effects of positive predic-
tion error signals and blunt the effects of negative error signals,
enhancing the associability term of attentional learning rules.
The consequences could be runaway synaptic strengths in post-
synaptic neurons. Second, enhanced dopamine-dependent
postsynaptic responsiveness and plasticity in orbitofrontal
neurons might reduce the distinction between risk and value
signals in orbitofrontal neurons, which might come to respond
to the higher values of risky outcomes while neglecting lower
outcomes, thus confounding risk and value signals and
producing an overly optimistic value signal. These two effects
could produce risk taking and lead to compulsive approach to
drugs.
Variations between Individuals
Behavioral economics suggests that humans perceive in-
structed outcome probabilities in a distorted manner, often
overestimating low probabilities and underestimating high prob-
abilities below p = 1.0. In close correspondence to behavioral
measures, neuronal responses in human prefrontal cortex
show similar probability distortions, suggesting that this brain
region codes probability in a subjective rather than objective
manner (Figure 5C) (Tobler et al., 2008; Hsu et al., 2009). Addic-
tive drugs may induce new or exacerbate existing probability
distortions by increasing tonic dopamine levels, which impair
mnemonic processes (Murphy et al., 1996; Elliott et al., 1997)
that are necessary for adequate probability estimation. This
mechanism may lead to altered risk assessment, which relies
on probability estimation, and may induce enhanced risk taking
if probabilities of high outcomes become overestimated.
Stimuli associatedwithhigher riskelicit increasingactivations in
human striatum and orbitofrontal cortex (Preuschoff et al., 2006;
Tobler et al., 2007). The risk-related activations covary with
individual risk aversion in lateral orbitofrontal cortex and with
risk-seeking in medial frontal cortex (Figure 5D). Risk affects
decision making by influencing the subjective values of
competing outcomes. Indeed, the terms ‘‘risk aversion’’ and
‘‘risk taking’’ indicate that risk reduces or enhances subjective
reward value. This concept constitutes a basic characteristic of
economic utility theory. As a direct neuronal correlate, risk
enhances neuronal value responses in lateral prefrontal cortex
of human risk seekers and reduces value responses in risk
avoiders (Figure 5E) (Tobler et al., 2009). Thus, both the coding
of risk itself and the influence of risk on value coding correlate
withbehavioral riskpreferencesof individuals, suggesting subjec-
tive rather thanobjectiveprocessing.Because thesemechanisms
occur in frontal cortical areas that are innervated by dopamine
neurons, basically all phasic and tonic alterations of dopamine
functions by addictive drugs may affect risk preferences.
Initial Drug Episodes
When thrill-seeking, peer pressure, or mental disorders
encourage a few initial drug taking episodes, neuronal risk
signals might change under the influence of these drugs and
lead to changes in behavioral risk preferences. If these changesturn into an increased willingness to take risks, individuals may
engage in further drug taking and develop an addiction. Thus
altered neuronal risk processing could play a particularly detri-
mental role during initial, preaddictive stages of drug taking.
Adaptive Reward Coding
Neuronal responses to reward are optimized for reward discrim-
ination. The mechanism involves adjusting the range of neuronal
coding to the range of currently available reward values or, more
specifically, matching probability distributions of neuronal
responses to probability distributions of reward values. The
adaptive process may be disturbed when addictive drugs alter
reward valuation or prediction, perception of reward range, or
the adjustment process itself. The consequences would be
suboptimal learning and reward discrimination.
Normal Mechanisms
Whereas the processing capacity of the brain is subject to
biological constraints, the number of possible rewards is almost
unlimited. Dedicating equal processing capacity to all possible
rewards would lead to low slopes of reward-response functions
and poor reward discrimination. However, the amount of avail-
able rewards can vary considerably, and often only a few
rewards are available. An efficient mechanism could maintain
good discrimination by matching neuronal processing to
currently available rewards and neglecting rewards that are
absent. Such adaptation would adjust learning to current
demands, optimize reward-response slopes for reward discrim-
ination, and improve behavioral choices. Indeed, the behavioral
contrast effect in experimental psychology and the reference
dependency in experimental economics demonstrate that
outcomes are valued within changing frames of reference and
that identical outcomes are valued differently depending on
which alternatives are available (Tinklepaugh, 1928; Crespi,
1942; Black, 1968; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). If neuronal
processing focuses on current probability distributions of reward
values, reward-response slopes adapt and reward discrimina-
tion becomes optimal. Adaptations occur to the main parame-
ters of probability distributions (Figure 6A), namely expected
value and standard deviation. Thus, appropriate adaptation
requires correct assessment of these parameters.
Prediction errors for updating reward values need to distin-
guish between twoprincipal types of reward fluctuation: changes
in expected value (step changes), and changes in standard devi-
ation (stochastic variations) (Figure 6B top). Prediction errors of
the same magnitudes are indistinguishable between step
changes and stochastic variations (Figure 6B middle). However,
a prediction error that is not particularly meaningful in stochastic
variations becomes quite meaningful when it reflects a major
step change above small fluctuations; here learning should be
strong (Behrens et al., 2007; Speekenbrink and Shanks, 2010).
Scaling prediction errors to standard deviation would relate
them to the underlying nature of fluctuation and make them
more meaningful (Figure 6B bottom) (Nassar et al., 2010).
Responses in many reward neurons of orbitofrontal cortex,
striatum, and amygdala adapt to the expected value and stan-
dard deviation of reward distributions (Figures 6C and 6D) (Trem-
blay and Schultz, 1999; Cromwell et al., 2005; Hosokawa et al.,
2007; Padoa-Schioppa, 2009; Kobayashi et al., 2010; BermudezNeuron 69, February 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 611
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Figure 6. Adaptive Reward Coding
(A) Schematics of adaptation of neuronal responses to expected value and standard deviation of reward value distributions.
(B) Schematics of reward fluctuations and adaptation of prediction errors (received reward value minus expected value). Top: The two principal types of
fluctuation, major change (left) and large stochastic variation (right). Middle: Prediction errors as such do not distinguish between fluctuation types. Bottom:
Prediction errors scaled via division by standard deviation distinguish major changes from stochastic variations of same size.
(C) Adaptation of neuronal reward response in orbitofrontal neuron to approximate expected value. Reward values as derived from behavioral preferences were
cereal < apple < raisin. Visual instructions predict type of reward, and trigger stimuli elicit an armmovement leading to the reward. Data from Tremblay and Schultz
(1999), with permission by MacMillan.
(D) Adaptation of neuronal response in orbitofrontal neuron to standard deviation of reward volume (ml). Inset shows change of reward-response slope in the
neuron shown in main part (result from two linear regressions on reward magnitude). Data from S. Kobayashi and W. Schultz (2010, Soc. Neurosci., abstract),
with permission by Society for Neuroscience.
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Perspectiveand Schultz, 2010b). The prediction error response of dopamine
neurons seems to be scaled by standard deviation (Tobler et al.,
2005); the underlying arithmetic division could involve shunting
inhibitions along dendrites and soma. The phenomenon is also
found in human orbitofrontal cortex and striatum (Breiter et al.,
2001; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). Ventral striatal lesions in rats
reduce behavioral reward contrast (Leszczuk and Flaherty,
2000). These data suggest a role of the dopamine system and
other reward structures in adaptation to reward value.
Potential Vulnerabilities
Coding of expected value and standard deviation. Adaptive
reward coding requires appropriate neuronal processing of
experienced and predicted probability distributions of reward
values and their key parameters. Basically all phasic and tonic
alterations of presynaptic and postsynaptic dopamine functions
by addictive drugsmay alter the assessment of reward value and
standard deviation. Inadequate processing of reward contin-
gency would compromise the predictive components of adap-
tive coding.
Adaptation process. Addictive drugs may compromise the
adaptation process itself. The scaling of dopamine responses
by shunting inhibition could be compromised by altered long-
term potentiation or depression at dopamine input synapses.
The effects of altered dopamine prediction error responses,612 Neuron 69, February 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.boosted by blockade of dopamine reuptake with amphetamine
and cocaine, could lead to changes in short-term postsynaptic
dopamine-dependent plasticity in striatum, orbitofrontal cortex,
and amygdala, which might constitute a substrate for the adap-
tation. The working memory and discrimination impairments
following increased tonic dopamine levels (Murphy et al., 1996;
Elliott et al., 1997) could destabilize the adjustment to the current
reward distribution.
Consequences. Malfunctioning adaptive coding would lead to
suboptimal reward discrimination (Figure 7). The mechanisms
include saturation of neuronal coding at lower or higher reward
values (Figures 7A–7C and 7F), incomplete use of neuronal
coding range (Figures 7A, 7B, 7D, and 7E), and unnecessarily
flat reward-response slopes (Figure 7D). As a result, the neurons
would be unable to accurately assess and discriminate the
values of different rewards, which may contribute to an exagger-
ated subjective valuation of drugs. Wrong scaling of reward
prediction error signals may lead also to confusion between
step changes and stochastic variations and induce unwarranted
learning and unstable approach behavior.
Decision Making
The acquisition of rewards, including addictive drugs, involves
choices between different, predictable options. Economic
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Figure 7. Malfunctioning Adaptive Coding Leading to Suboptimal Reward Discrimination
(A) Underadaptation of neuronal coding to changed expected value (EV) results in insufficient shift of new coding range, lack of coding of lower reward values
(open rectangle below x axis), and incomplete use of upper neuronal coding range (open rectangle at y axis).
(B) Overadaptation to EV results in saturation at higher values and incomplete use of lower neuronal coding range (open rectangles at x and y axes, respectively).
(C) Underadaptation to increased standard deviation (SD) results in saturation at lower and higher values (open rectangles below x axis).
(D) Overadaptation to increased SD results in incomplete use of lower and upper neuronal coding range (open rectangles at y axis) and unnecessarily flat reward-
response slope.
(E) Underadaptation to decreased SD results in incomplete use of lower and upper neuronal coding range (open rectangles at y axis).
(F) Overadaptation to decreased SD results in saturation at lower and higher values (open rectangles below x axis).
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Perspectivedecision processes use values of predicted rewards as inputs
and engage comparisons between these values. Because
most valuation and comparison mechanisms engage the dopa-
mine system and its postsynaptic structures, decision making is
likely to be disrupted by the impact of drugs on dopamine mech-
anisms.
Normal Mechanisms
An economic decision variable uses information from a number
of heterogeneous neuronal reward signals in a form that is
appropriate for the specific comparison mechanism underlying
the decision process. These variables serve as inputs to decision
processes or as their outputs toward the execution of behavioral
choices. Current simple decision models are based on compar-
isons between subjective values of predicted options, including
hedonic aspects. All other parameters contributing to decisions,
including reward delay and risk, would be transformed into value
in order to participate in decisions (e.g., via temporal discounting
and risk aversion). Thus all valuation processes described above
will influence decision making.
In reinforcement theory, predicted action value represents
a key input variable (the reward value obtained for a specific
action irrespective of that action being chosen) (Sutton and
Barto, 1998). Object value could serve an analogous role (the
value of a specific reward object irrespective of being chosen).
Chosen value (the value of the chosen option) is an output vari-
able of the decision process. Neurons in striatum code action
value (Figure 8A; Samejima et al., 2005; Lau and Glimcher,
2008), orbitofrontal neurons code object value (Figure 8B; Pa-
doa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006), and striatal and orbitofrontal
neurons code chosen value (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad,
2006; Lau and Glimcher, 2008). Dopamine reward prediction
error signals are thought to update these decision variables
with current reward values. The comparison between valueswould involve, in the most simple case, a winner-take-all mech-
anism that transforms a graded difference into an all-or-none
distinction. This model is adequate for economic choices
between alternatives with known values (Sutton and Barto,
1998).
In other decision models, value comparisons employ the ratio
of reward probabilities of all predicted options as decision vari-
able (log-likelihood ratio; see Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Neurons
in parietal cortex code this decision variable during probabilistic
reward choice (Figure 8C; Yang and Shadlen, 2007). Concepts of
sensory discrimination and decision making suggest that more
sophisticated decisions involve gradual accumulation of
evidence and can be modeled by competing bounded diffusion
processes (Ratcliff et al., 1999; Gold and Shadlen, 2007). In
economic decisions, the current values of the individual options
may race in a random walk fashion toward specific thresholds;
the option whose process reaches its threshold first determines
the behavioral choice. Formal modeling suggests feasible
combinations of winner-take-all and diffusion-race models
(Lo and Wang, 2006). Thus, decision mechanisms require valua-
tion, prediction, working memory, computations, comparisons,
and planning.
Potential Vulnerabilities
Subjective reward values and log likelihood ratios constitute
decision variables that serve as inputs to decision mechanisms.
The addiction process is associated with an increased subjec-
tive valuation of drugs, irrespective of drug value at first use.
Depending on the reward system under study, the value increase
could be induced by themolecular action of the drug on neuronal
reward mechanisms and constitute an essential component of
the addiction process; alternatively, the value could increase
as a simple consequence of the addiction process occurring in
other brain structures. Enhanced positive reward prediction errorNeuron 69, February 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 613
1 sec
<-0.1=p=0.5-> <-0.5=p=0.9->
<-0.9=p=0.5-> <-0.5=p=0.1->
Stimulus     MvmtStimulus     MvmtA
Im
pu
lse
s/
s
Im
pu
ls
e
s/
s
0
10
10
0
B
-
lo
gL
R 
+
Im
pu
ls
e
s/
s
0
40 30
C
logLR
0 4-2
Time (ms)
6000
Reward size (B : A)
1:3 21:1 3:1 6:1 300
Figure 8. Neuronal Coding of Decision Variables
(A) Action value coding in a striatum neuron. This neuron coded left action
value, as premovement activity correlated with reward probability for left
movement trials (p = 0.9 compared to p = 0.1; left, brown versus blue), but
not for right trials (right, green versus red). Data from Samejima et al. (2005),
with permission by American Association for the Advancement of Science.
(B) Object value coding in orbitofrontal neurons. This neuron coded the size of
reward juice B but not juice A. Data from Padoa-Schioppa and Assad (2006),
with permission by MacMillan.
(C) Coding of log-likelihood ratio in a parietal cortex neuron. Neuronal activity
increases with the log-likelihood ratio for a target in the response field of this
neuron being rewarded. Data from Yang and Shadlen (2007), with permission
by MacMillan.
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Perspectivesignals, and blunted negative error signals, would lead to supra-
normal reward values of drugs. Reuptake blockade and
increased dopamine-dependent postsynaptic responsiveness
and plasticity would enhance the predictive neuronal coding of
action value, object value, and chosen value of drugs in dopa-
mine-innervated brain structures. Insufficient adaptive coding
would produce suboptimal neuronal discrimination between
reward values (Figure 7). Altered tonic striatal and frontal dopa-
mine concentrations would impair working memory processes
necessary for assessing contingencies and reward probabilities
and computing log-likelihood ratios. Irrespective of the addiction
mechanism acting on the individual neuron, the resulting high
value of the drug would dominate the decision process and
produce strong behavioral choices that appear to be beyond
voluntary control.
Reward values would be integrated with subjective prefer-
ences to serve as inputs to decision mechanisms. Drugs can
affect reward preferences in multiple ways via alterations of
phasic and tonic dopamine processes, as described above for
risk preferences.
Most of the drug-induced alterations of neuronal reward
mechanisms may impact neuronal decision mechanisms.
Altered tonic striatal and frontal dopamine concentrations would
affect winner-take-all computations. Alterations in phasic and
tonic dopamine activities might affect the electrophysiological
noise in neurons, change random walks of activity in diffusion-614 Neuron 69, February 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.race models, and allow drug-related activity to reach decision
thresholds first. These drug-induced alterations of decision
processes would affect behavioral choices between rewards
and may result in exaggerated preferences for drug rewards.
Some of these mechanisms may explain the general behavioral
deficits in decision making observed in drug abusers (Rogers
et al., 1999; Kalivas and Volkow, 2005), which, similar to the
dual systems account of temporal discounting, may involve
inhibitory prefrontal and impulsive subcortical reward systems
(Chambers et al., 2003; Bechara, 2005).ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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